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Derecho a la asistencia humanitaria

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Entre el marco del acceso humanitario, existen restricciones al acceso considerados legítimos y otros no. Este derecho a la asistencia no existe según el Derecho Internacional Humanitario, estrictamente hablando, en tiempos de paz, incluso en el momento de desastres naturales.<ref>R. J. Hardcastle y A. T. L. Chua, "Humanitarian Assistance: Towards a Right of Access to Victims of Natural Disasters," International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 38, 1998, p. 589 hasta pp. 598-9.</ref> Sin embargo puede existir en algunos casos por ciertos contextos de conflicto armado.<ref>Peter Macalister-Smith, International Humanitarian Assistance: Disaster Relief Actions in International Law and Organization (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1985), p. 163.</ref>

Durante un conflicto armado, la repartición de la asistencia humanitaria emerge únicamente con respecto a las necesidades indispensables de la población civil. Es decir, cuando sea ofrecido o solicitado, la asistencia humanitario tiene que ser restringido a la población civil, no puede ser enviado a combatientes. Estos envíos deben incluir alimentos, agua potable, medicamentos, ropa, colchones y medios de albergue. La ropa, colchones y medios de albergue son particularmente relevantes para los refugiados y personas desplazadas, pero cualquier civil en una zona destruida (incluyendo ellos quedando en sus propios hogares) pueden tener otras necesidades incluyendo a alimentos, agua potable, y medicamentos.

Existen tres escenarios principales en que el envío de la asistencia humanitaria puede volver un tema de enfoque en el conflicto armado:

  1. Una parte beligerante controlando un territorio habitado por civiles posee las provisiones esenciales requeridos y, dada buena voluntad, podría distribuirlas sin dificultad para llegar a responder a su demanda. Sin embargo, sigue una política deliberada de rehusar la asistencia para los necesitados (particularmente, civiles enemigos o minorías perseguidas).
  2. Provisiones esenciales están disponibles a una parte beligerante que desee distribuirlos a los civiles con necesidades, pero el enemigo obstruye la distribución.
  3. Provisiones esenciales entre el territorio controlado por una parte beligerante son generalmente escazes, o el sistema de distribución ha colapsado por motivos del conflicto armado.

En los primeros dos instancias, la situación puede ser remediada a través de los beligerantes mismos (actuando solos o conjuntamente). En el tercero, el alivio humanitario puede llegar únicamente desde fuente externas - estados neutrales o organizaciones no gubernamentales, cuales deben ganar acceso humanitario a la zona afectada.

Derechos y Obligaciones

En terminos de teoría legal, es importante distinguir que en un conflicto armado existe un derecho supuesto por beneficiarios civiles demandar o obtener una asistencia humanitaria y un derecho de los estados (u organizaciones humanitarias imparciales, tales como el Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja (CICR) insistir en proveer tal asistencia).<ref>B. Jakovljevic, "The Right to Humanitarian Assistance: Legal Aspects," International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 27, 1987, p. 469 at p. 473.</ref> Si la asistencia está ofrecida por parte de un estado u organización neutral, los civiles pueden tener el derecho de insistir que los envíos llegan a su destino, y que los beligerantes en este caso puede tener la obligación correspondiente asegurar su libre paso.

Contextos de Asistencia Humanitaria

=Territorio Ocupado

Cuando un territorio enemigo está sujeto a la ocupación por beligerantes, la posición legal con respecto a la asistencia humanitaria de la población civil local es lo más claro. El Artículo 55(1) de la Cuarta Convención de Ginebra de 1949 prescribe que, "Al extento más amplio disponible a él, el Poder Ocupante tiene la obligación de asegurar los alimentos y los medicamentos de la población; debe, en particular, traer los alimentos, medicamentos y otros ítemes necesarios si los recursos del territorio ocupado son inadecuados."

El comentario de la CICR sobre esta Convención anota que según el Artículo 55(1), el Poder Ocupante incurre en una "obligación definitiva de mantener en un nivel razonable las condiciones materiales debajo de las cuales la población del territorio ocupado viven". Artículo 69(1) del Protocolo Adicional de 1977 amplia la lista de objetos especificados en el Artículo 55(1) itemizando además la ropa, colchones, medios de albergue y cualquier otros ítemes esenciales a la sobrevivencia de la población civil.

En utilizar la frase "hasta los medios disponibles a él" en Artículo 55(1) de la Cuarta Convención de Ginebra, además en Artículo 69(1), se entiende que el Poder Ocupante puede existir en el tiempo del conflicto armado en una situación dificil (incluso sujeto a bloqueo por fuerzas enemigas). Presumiendo que existe una falta de recursos, la pregunta es si el poder ocupante debe permitir que la asistencia humanitaria llega desde el exterior.

Artículo 59(1)-(2) de la Cuarta Convención de Ginebra aclara que "si toda o parte de la población del territorio ocupado está inadecuadamente abastecido, el Poder Ocupante acordará a planes de alivio a favor de tal población, y facilitará a ellos por todos los medios a su disposición. Tales esquemas, cuales pueden llevar a cabo por estados o por organizaciones humanitarios imparciales tales como el Comité Internacional de la Cruz Roja, consistirán, en particular, de la provisión de envíos de alimentos, medicamentos y ropa".

Como el comentario de la CICR sobre el Arículo 59 enfatizó, la obligación impuesta por el Poder Ocupante para facilitar tales envíos de alivio para que alcanza la población civil "es incondicional".

Una violación del artículo 59 no es enumerado en Artículo 147 como una de las "brechas graves" de la Convención. Pero por otro lado, "voluntariamente inhibiendo envíos de alivio como previsto en las Convenciones de Ginebra" se categoriza como un crimen de guerra en Artículo 8(b)(xxv) del Estatuto de Roma de la Corte Criminal Internacional.

Guerra de Asedio

La legalidad de estrategias de guerra de asedio no está contestada en el derecho internacional clásico; la legitimidad de intentar reducir un lugar asediado a través de la inanición "no fue cuestionado". Artículo 17 de la Cuarta Convención de Ginebral trata de guerra de asedio de una manera muy periférica, proclamando, "Las partes al conflicto intentarán concluir acuerdos locales para quitar de las zonas acercadas o asediadas de personas heridas, enfermas y de edad, niños y casos de maternidad, y para el paso de ministros de todas las religiones, personal médica y equipamiento médico en ruta a tales zonas." Obviamente, solamente categorías limitadas de civiles benefician de esta estipulación. Además, "Las palabras 'Las partes del conflicto intentarán' muestran que debajo de la Convención la evacuación no es requerida"; Artículo 17 consiste según esta interpretación a una recomendación fuerte a los beligerantes concluir un acuerdo efectuando la salida de las personas enumeradas.

Sin embargo, la posición legal cambia de manera radical en Artículo 54 de Protocolo Adicional I, cual lee:

  1. Inanición de los civiles como método de guerra está prohibida.
  2. Se prohibe atacar, destruir, quitar o volver inútil objetos indispensables a la sobrevivencia de la población civil, tales como alimentos, zonas agrícolas para la producción de alimentos, cultivos, ganado, infraestructura de agua potable y instalaciones de irrigación para el fin expreso de negarles su valor sustantivo a la población civil o a la Parte adversa, cualquier sea el motivo, sea para causar inanición entre los civiles, causarlos trastearse, o por cualquier otro motivo.
  3. Las prohibiciones en Párrafo 2 no aplicarán como tal a los objetos cubiertos por él utilizados por una Parte adversa:
    1. como sustento únicamente para miembros de sus fuerzas armadas; o
    2. si no como sustento, luego en apoyo directo a la acción militar, dado, sin embargo, que en ninún caso tales acciones contra estos objetos se toman que pueden esperar dejan a la población civil con alimentos o agua inadecuados como para causar su inanición o forzar su movimiento.

La inanición de los civiles no está enumerada en Protocolo I como una "brecha grave" (y luego un crimen de guerra). Sin embargo, se debe anotar que en Artículo 8(2)(b)(xxv) del Estatuto de Roma se incluye entre la lista de crimenes de guerra: "Intencionalmente utilizando a la inanición de los civiles como un método de guerra deprivandolos de objetos indispensables para su sobrevivencia, incluyendo voluntariamente inhibiendo el envío de alivio como previsto en las Convenciones de Ginebra." Estas últimas palabras estigmitizan como crimen de guerra la negación deliberada de la asistencia humanitaria en brecha de las Convenciones de Ginebra.

Un asedio a un pueblo defendido (habitado por civiles) debe ser distinguido de una cerca de una fortaleza militar. En el último caso, dado que el sustento serían únicamente de las fuerzas armadas enemigas, la inanición es un método legítimo de guerra, y se permite la destrucción sistemática de todos los alimentos que pueden ser utilizados por los asediados. En contraste, en el primer caso, cuando los civiles están directamente afectados, la inanición y la destrucción de los alimentos son prohibidos. De acuerdo a Protocolo I, "Una oferta de alimentos necesitada por la población civil no pierde su protección sencillamente porque también se utiliza por parte de las fuerzas armadas y puede técnicamente calificarse como un objetivo militar. Tiene que ser utilizado exclusivamente por las fuerzas armadas para así perder su inmunidad."

Bloqueo marítima

Artículo 23(1) de la Cuarta Convención de Ginebra declara, "Cada Parte permitirá el paso libre de todos envíos de provisiones médicas y hospitalarias y objetos necesarios para ceremonias religiosas con destino únicamente a los civiles de otra Parte, incluso si el último es un adversario. Igualmente permitirá el paso libre de todos envíos de alimentos esenciales, ropa y tonica con destino a niños menores de quince años, madres gestantes y casos de maternidad."

Aunque ninguna referencia explícita al bloqueo está hecho en Artículo 23(1), no existe duda alguna que el bloqueo constituye el contexto de esta clausula. La obligación creada es extremadamente limitada. Aparte de ser sujeta a varias condiciones deletreadas en otros párrafos de Artículo 23, el libre paso de envíos para todos civiles se restringe a medicamentos y otros ítemes (alimentos y ropa) están destinados a ciertas partes de la población considerada más vulnerable. No existe un requerimiento permitir el envío de alimentos y ropa a la población civil en general.

Otras provisiones perteneciendo a los bloqueos aparecen en Artículo 59(3)-(4) de la Convención. Párrafo (3) anota que "Todas las Partes permitirán el libre paso de estos envíos y garantizarán su protección." De acuerdo a Párrafo 4, "Un poder dando libre paso a los envíos en ruta al territorio ocupado por la Parte adversa al conflicto tendrá el derecho de revisar los envíos, regular su paso de acuerdo a tiempos y rutas predeterminadas, y estar razonablemente satisfechas a través del Poder Protector que estos envíos se utilizará para el alivio de la población con necesidade4s y no estarán utilizados a beneficio del Poder Ocupante." Estas estipulaciones, por supuesto, deben ser leídos conjuntamente con Párrafos 1 y 2 del Artículo 59, tratando de envíos de alivio a territorios ocupados. Párrafo 3 se vea según el Comentario CICR como "la clave del sistema entero"; y su énfasis es tal que envíos deben ser permitidos cruzar un bloqueo, sujeto a verificación y supervisión.

La prohibición, como se notó, en Protocolo I - de la inanición de los civiles como un método de guerra en sí no vuelve el bloqueo ilegal como un método de guerra, dado que tal inaninición no sirve con el propósito único del bloqueo. Esto sigue del lenguaje de Artículo 49(3) del Protocolo: "Las provisiones de esta Sección (Artículos 48-67) aplican a cualquier guerra terrestre, aerea o marítima que puede afectar a la población civil, civiles individuales o objetos civiles en la tierra. Además aplican a todos los ataques desde el mar o el aire contra objetivos en la tierra pero en otro caso no afectan las reglas del derecho internacional aplicables en el conflicto armado maritimo o aereo."

Como el comentario CICR sobre el Protocolo explica, el párrafo, "En general los delegados en la Conferencia Diplomática fueron guiados por una preocupación de no llevar a cabo una revisión de las reglas aplicables al conflicto armado marítimo y aereo. Por esto las palabras 'sobre tierra' fueron retenidos y una segunda frase claramente indicando que el Protocolo no cambia el derecho internacional aplicable a tales situaciones fue agregado."<ref>Yves Sandoz et al., eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, Nijhoff, 1987), p. 606.</ref>

Extranjeros

Hasta donde los extranjeros en el territorio de una Parte al conflicto están considerados, Artículo 38(1) de la Cuarta Convención de Ginebra los confiere el derecho "recibir alivio individual o colectivo que puede ser enviado a ellos".

El Comentario expande, "Alivio como aquí considerado consistirá, por ejemplo, en envíos de alimentos, ropa o medicamentos enviados a las personas protegidas individualmente o colectivamente. Tales envíos pueden venir tanto desde el país de origen de las personas protegidas o desde cualquier otro país y puede ser envíado por individuos privados, organizaciones humanitarios o gobiernos."

El derecho de las personas protegidas recibir envíos de alivio implica la obligación del país de residencia permitir los envíos entrada a su territorio y pasarlos intacto a su destinatario.

Alivio del Extranjero

Artículo 70 del Protocolo I pronuncia:

  1. Si la población civil de cualquier territorio debajo del control de una Parte del conflicto, aparte de territorio ocupado, no está adecuadamente provisionado con las prov

Relief from the Outside

Article 70 of Protocol I pronounces:

1. If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, other than occupied territory, is not adequately provided with the supplies mentioned in Article 69, relief actions which are humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief actions. Offers of such relief shall not be regarded as an interference in the armed conflict or as unfriendly acts. In the distribution of relief consignments, priority shall be given to those persons, such as children, expectant mothers, maternity cases and nursing mothers, who, under the Fourth Convention or under this Protocol, are to be accorded privileged treatment or special protection.

2. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party shall allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of all relief consignments, equipment and personnel provided in accordance with this Section, even if such assistance is destined for the civilian population of the Adverse Party.

3. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party which allow the passage of relief consignments, equipment and personnel in accordance with paragraph 2:

(a) shall have the right to prescribe the technical arrangements, including search, under which such passage is permitted;

(b) may make such permission conditional on the distribution of this assistance being made under the local supervision of a Protecting Power;

(c) shall, in no way whatsoever, divert relief consignments from the purpose for which they are intended nor delay their forwarding, except in cases of urgent necessity in the interest of the civilian population concerned.

4. The Parties to the conflict shall protect relief consignments and facilitate their rapid distribution.

5. The Parties to the conflict and each High Contracting Party concerned shall encourage and facilitate effective international co-ordination of the relief actions referred to in paragraph 1.34

In contradistinction to article 23(1) of Geneva Convention (IV) cited earlier, article 70(1) of Protocol I "expands relief entitlement to the whole population, and not only to vulnerable segments" thereof.35 Furthermore, article 70(1) employs the phrase "shall be undertaken," which-when taken alone-"clearly implies an obligation to accept relief offers meeting the requirements mentioned in the article."36 However, one cannot disregard the glaring fact that implementation of the implied obligation is explicitly subject to an agreement between the parties concerned. "Consent-the expression of sovereignty-is hence a basic principle in the exercise of the right to humanitarian assistance in armed conflicts."37

As long as an agreement by all concerned lies at the root of relief actions, one cannot speak of a genuine obligation to allow, or a genuine right to obtain, humanitarian assistance. At best, article 70(1) may be construed as precluding refusal of agreement to relief for arbitrary or capricious reasons.38 Regrettably, there are a host of nonarbitrary and practical reasons that can be invoked by a belligerent in armed conflict if it chooses to withhold its consent from the delivery of relief supplies to civilians. The upshot is that the framers of article 70(1) created "the impression of an ironclad obligation, and at the same time took the bite out of that rule."39

Noninternational Armed Conflicts

For the legal position in noninternational armed conflicts, it is necessary to consult two sources. First, there is common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which states, "An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict."40 Undeniably, the pivotal word here is "offer." Hence, the parties to the conflict can always choose to decline it.41

The second source is the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II).42 Article 14 of Protocol II prohibits both starvation of civilians as a method of combat and attacking objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population.43 However, it must be taken into account that the 1998 Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court- which, as mentioned, brands as a war crime the starvation of civilians in an international armed conflict (including the deliberate denial of humanitarian relief supplies as provided for by the Geneva Conventions)-does not treat in the same manner the starvation of civilians in a noninternational armed conflict. The omission was by no means accidental.44 It is conspicuous in light of the long catalogue of war crimes in internal armed conflicts encompassed in article 8 of the statute.45



Even those advocating the illegality of a blockade giving rise to starvation of civilians are forced to concede that their position collides head-on with the original intention of the diplomatic conference.



Article 18 of Protocol II prescribes:

1. Relief societies located in the territory of the High Contracting Party, such as Red Cross (Red Crescent, Red Lion and Sun) organizations, may offer their services for the performance of their traditional functions in relation to the victims of the armed conflict. . . .

2. If the civilian population is suffering undue hardship owing to a lack of the supplies essential for its survival, such as foodstuffs and medical supplies, relief actions for the civilian population which are of an exclusively humanitarian and impartial nature and which are conducted without any adverse distinction shall be undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.46

A leading role in the field of international humanitarian assistance is traditionally played by the ICRC.47 Yet, interestingly enough, article 18 of Protocol II does not mention the ICRC by name. Thus, if one looks for a legal niche to accommodate the ICRC, it is necessary to fall back upon common article 3. "Paradoxically, it can thus be said that in this respect it is common article 3 which 'develops and supplements' the Protocol rather than vice versa."48

Article 18(2) appropriately imposes the condition of nondiscrimination in the distribution of humanitarian assistance from the outside; supplies cannot be sent solely to one section of the civilian population and be denied to other groups. But once more, the core issue is that of consent, which is emphatically required. The ICRC commentary suggests that if the survival of the civilian population is threatened, the authorities responsible cannot withhold their consent without good grounds (implying that such action would constitute a violation of article 14).49 The trouble is that as long as consent is essential, those authorities can usually find plausible excuses for delaying humanitarian assistance, and even for frustrating it altogether.

UN Security Council Resolutions

Occasionally, the Security Council of the United Nations adopts resolutions calling upon the parties to an armed conflict to allow unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to civilians. Such calls must be analyzed carefully. More often than not, they are couched in merely hortatory terms, as recommendations, in which case they do not per se introduce any change in the legal situation. Where relief is contingent on the consent of the parties concerned, consent remains the crux of the issue. Still, at times the Security Council resorts to binding language, citing specifically chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (devoted to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security).50 Pursuant to article 25 of the Charter, all members of the United Nations must "accept and carry out" the decisions of the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter.51 It is not entirely clear which decisions of the Council are covered by article 25, but decisions under chapter VII are indisputably binding.52 Thus, when the Security Council decides to exercise the powers vested in it by virtue of chapter VII, the legal rights and obligations of the parties to the conflict undergo a fundamental transformation; their freedom of action is curtailed.

It is only natural that the Security Council tends to move gradually in this field (as in others), first urging parties (in a nonbinding fashion) to allow unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to civilians, and only subsequently (when its appeal remains unheeded) moving to assert itself under chapter VII in a binding fashion and even imposing sanctions. A good illustration can be found in a series of resolutions of 1992 relating to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Security Council first adopted Resolution 752, simply calling upon the parties to ensure that conditions be established for the effective and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance.53 Then, the Security Council demanded in Resolution 757-specifically referring to chapter VII-that the parties immediately create these conditions.54 In Resolution 770, the Security Council-again acting under chapter VII-expressed its determination to create as soon as possible the necessary conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance wherever required in Bosnia-Herzegovina.55 When all else failed, the Security Council decided, in Resolution 781, to establish a ban on military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina, considering the measure to constitute "an essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance."56 It is possible to say that in Bosnia-Herzegovina the protection of humanitarian aid became "the de facto raison d'être of the UN mission."57

The Use of Force to Ensure Relief

A separate question is whether forcible measures can be used against a state contravening the right to humanitarian assistance (in the specific circumstances in which that right exists). There is a school of thought holding that states may use force at their discretion to coerce a recalcitrant nation to respect international humanitarian law (so-called "humanitarian intervention").58 However, "humanitarian intervention is not an exception to the [UN] Charter prohibitions on the use of force."59 The Charter prohibits any use of unilateral force in interstate relations, except in circumstances of self-defense in response to an armed attack.60 The International Court of Justice in 1986, in the Nicaragua case, rejected the notion that forcible humanitarian intervention is permissible on a unilateral basis.61

On the other hand, article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations instructs the Security Council to determine when a threat to the peace occurs.62 Upon concluding that a situation amounts to a threat to the peace, the Security Council is empowered to resort to enforcement action against the state concerned. "[A] threat to the peace in the sense of Article 39 seems to be whatever the Security Council says is a threat to the peace."63 The Security Council definitely can decide that the deliberate blocking of humanitarian assistance to civilians in dire need of it amounts to a threat to the peace and that an enforcement action is the proper remedy.



Inaction by the Security Council does not amount to authorization for collective security measures, even by a regional organization.



Indeed, in Resolution 794 (1992), the Security Council authorized member states to use "all necessary means" to establish "a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia."64 The expression "all necessary means" has become a commonly employed euphemism for the use of force (which indeed followed, in the Somalia case, although success proved elusive).

Pursuant to article 53(1) of the Charter, the Security Council can, where appropriate, utilize regional organizations "for enforcement action under its authority."65 Article 53(1) does not diminish from the monopoly of the Security Council, as established in the Charter, in the realm of collective security. The legality of the enforcement action by a regional organization is entirely contingent on Security Council authorization.66 The Security Council can launch or approve a genuine humanitarian intervention, in order to counter breaches of the right to assistance-or of any other norm of international law-that it deems threats to peace. However, no state acting solitarily-nor even a regional organization-can arrogate the powers of the Security Council.

In March-June 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization launched a continuous campaign of severe and sustained aerial attacks against Yugoslavia, with a view to compelling a settlement of the issue of Kosovo. It is true that prior to the attacks, in Resolution 1199 (1998), the Security Council, acting under chapter VII of the Charter, had affirmed that "the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region."67 That affirmation was repeated in Resolution 1203 (1998), also based on chapter VII.68 Resolution 1199 noted a Yugoslav commitment "to ensure full and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations, the ICRC and the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees], and delivery of humanitarian supplies."69 The Security Council, alarmed by what it termed an "impending humanitarian catastrophe" in Kosovo, was fully competent to take or authorize enforcement action against Yugoslavia, by identifying a threat to the peace.70 However, absent authorization from the Council, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had no right to resort to enforcement action. The members of the Organization, individually or collectively, are entitled to invoke self-defense when faced with armed attacks by (or at least from) other states. But when there is no armed attack against a sovereign state, and in the face of humanitarian repression amounting only to a threat to the peace, only the Security Council is empowered by the Charter to use, or to authorize the use of, force.

It is true that the Security Council did not condemn the air campaign in Serbia and Kosovo.71 All the same, inaction by the Security Council does not amount to authorization for collective security measures, even by a regional organization.72 The language of Resolution 1244 (1999), adopted by the Security Council following the agreement between the parties that ended the air attacks, did not imply retroactive ratification of the use of force by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.73 In any event, the Security Council's authorization must be sought before, not subsequent to, regional enforcement action.74 Otherwise, a permanent member of the Security Council could "shift the burden of the veto" by acting unilaterally and then blocking any resolution terminating the action.75

It appears that the right to humanitarian assistance-as it exists under contemporary international law-is quite limited in scope. There is no doubt that there is a growing demand by world opinion for extension of the right. Such an extension would require new international legislation, in the form of a new treaty, which in turn should address the problems arising both in peacetime and in time of armed conflict (either international or internal).

It is regrettable that instead of addressing this core issue, the substance of the law of humanitarian assistance, recent debate has focused on the question of enforcement. Humanitarian assistance must not be confused with unilateral or regional "humanitarian intervention." The moral duty of providing relief to innocent victims of armed conflict and natural disasters devolves on the entire international community. Enforcement, where necessary, should be authorized by the central organ of that community-the Security Council.




9. Uhler and Coursier, eds. (supra, note 6),

p. 320.

10. Geneva Convention (IV) (supra, note 5), p. 547.

11. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 [hereafter Rome Statute], International Legal Materials, vol. 37, 1998, p. 999 at p. 1008. On the ICC, see Michael N. Schmitt and Peter J. Richards, "Into Uncharted Waters: The International Criminal Court," Naval War College Review, Winter 2000, pp. 93-106.

12. Charles C. Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States, 2d ed., vol. 3 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1945), p. 1803.

13. Geneva Convention (IV) (supra, note 5), p. 507.

14. See Uhler and Coursier, eds. (supra, note 6), pp. 138-9.

15. Protocol I (supra, note 7), pp. 652-3.

16. See ibid., art. 85, pp. 671-2.

17. Rome Statute (supra, note 11), p. 1008.

18. See Yoram Dinstein, "Siege Warfare and the Starvation of Civilians," in Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict Challenges Ahead: Essays in Honour of Frits Kalshoven, ed. A. J. M. Delissen and G. J. Tanja (Dordrecht, Neth., and Boston: Nijhoff, 1991), p. 145 at p. 150.

19. H. Blix, "Means and Methods of Combat," in International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law, ed. UNESCO (Geneva: Henry Dunant, 1988), p. 135 at p. 143.

20. See A. P. V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester Univ. Press, 1996), p. 63.

21. Geneva Convention (IV) (supra, note 5), pp. 508-9.

22. See Uhler and Coursier, eds. (supra, note 6), pp. 178-9.

23. Geneva Convention (IV) (supra, note 5), p. 509.

24. E. Rosenblad, "Starvation as a Method of Warfare-Conditions for Regulation by Convention," International Lawyer, vol. 7, 1973, pp. 261-2.

25. Geneva Convention (IV) (supra, note 5), p. 519.

26. Ibid.

27. See Uhler and Coursier, eds. (supra, note 6), pp. 321-2.

28. See Louise Doswald-Beck, ed., San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1995), p. 179.

29. Protocol I (supra, note 7), p. 650.

30. Yves Sandoz et al., eds., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, Nijhoff, 1987), p. 606.

31. See Dieter Fleck, ed., The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), p. 471.

32. Geneva Convention (IV) (supra, note 5), pp. 512-3.

33. See Uhler and Coursier, eds. (supra, note 6), pp. 246-7.

34. Protocol I (supra, note 7), p. 663.

35. See R. Provost, "Starvation as a Weapon: Legal Implications of the United Nations Food Blockade against Iraq and Kuwait," Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 30, 1992, p. 577 at p. 612.

36. Michael Bothe, "Relief Actions," in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, ed. Rudolf Bernhardt, vol. 4 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1982), p. 173 at p. 176.

37. See M. Torrelli, "From Humanitarian Assistance to 'Intervention on Humanitarian Grounds,'" International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 32, 1992, p. 228 at p. 232.

38. See ibid.; Sandoz et al., eds. (supra, note 30), p. 819; and C. A. Allen, "Civilian Starvation and Relief during Armed Conflict: The Modern Humanitarian Law," Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, vol. 19, 1989, p. 1 at p. 72.

39. Elmar Rauch, The Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Repercussions on the Law of Naval Warfare (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1984), pp. 91-2.

40. Geneva Convention (IV) (supra, note 5), pp. 376-7, 404-5, 430, and 501-2.

41. J. S. Pictet, ed., Commentary, I Geneva Convention (1952), p. 58.

42. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1977 [hereafter Protocol II], in Schindler and Toman, eds. (supra, note 5), p. 689.

43. Ibid., p. 697.

44. See C. Rottensteiner, "The Denial of Humanitarian Assistance as a Crime under International Law," International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 81, 1999, p. 555 at p. 568.

45. Rome Statute, arts. 8(2)(c)-(f) (supra, note 11), pp. 1008-9

46. Ibid., p. 698.

47. See D. P. Forsythe, "International Humanitarian Assistance: The Role of the Red Cross," Buffalo Journal of International Law, vol. 3, 1996-1997, p. 235 at p. 237.

48. G. Abi-Saab, "Non-International Armed Conflicts," in UNESCO, ed. (supra, note 19), p. 217 at p. 232.

49. Sandoz et al., eds. (supra, note 30), p. 1479.

50. Charter of the United Nations, 1945 [hereafter Charter], in International Legislation: A Collection of Texts of Multipartite International Instruments of General Interest Beginning with the Covenant of the League of Nations, ed. M. O. Hudson, vol. 9 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950), p. 327 at pp. 343-6.

51. Ibid., p. 339.

52. Cf. the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice re Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), International Court of Justice Reports, 1971, p. 16 at pp. 52-3.

53. Security Council Resolution 752 (1992), International Legal Materials, vol. 31, 1992, p. 1451 at p. 1452, para. 8.

54. Security Council Resolution 757 (1992), ibid.,p. 1453 at p. 1458, para. 17.

55. Security Council Resolution 770 (1992), ibid., p. 1468 at p. 1469.

56. Security Council Resolution 781 (1992), ibid., p. 1478. The ban was reaffirmed in Security Council Resolution 786 (1992), ibid., p. 1479 at p. 1480.

57. A. J. Hillen, Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations (McLean, Va.: Brassey's, 1998), p. 172.

58. See, e.g., J.-P. L. Fonteyne, "The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity under the U.N. Charter," California Western International Law Journal, vol. 4, 1973-1974, pp. 203-54.

59. J. I. Charney, "Anticipatory Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo," American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, 1999, p. 834 at p. 836.

60. See Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, 2d ed. (Cambridge, U.K.: Grotius, 1994), p. 89.

61. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Merits), [1986], International Court of Justice Reports, 1986, p. 14 at pp. 134-5. Cf. N. S. Rodley, "Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the World Court," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 38, 1989, p. 321 at p. 332.

62. Charter (supra, note 50), p. 343.

63. M. B. Akehurst, Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th ed., ed. P. Malanczuk (London: Allen and Unwin, 1997).

64. Security Council Resolution 794 (1992), Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, vol. 47, 1992, p. 63 at p. 64.

65. Charter (supra, note 50), p. 347.

66. See C. Walter, "Security Council Control over Regional Action," Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, vol. 1, 1997, p. 129 at p. 154.

67. Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998), International Legal Materials, vol. 38, 1999, p. 249 at p. 250.

68. Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998), UN Doc. S/RES/1203 (1998), p. 2.

69. Security Council Resolution 1199 (supra, note 67), p. 251.

70. Ibid., p. 249.

71. See Ruth Wedgwood, "NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia," American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, 1999, p. 828 at pp. 830-1.

72. See O. Schachter, "The Right of States to Use Armed Force," Michigan Law Review, vol. 82, 1984, p. 1620 at pp. 1640-1.

73. Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), UN Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).

74. See G. Ress, "Article 53," The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary, ed. Bruno Simma (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1995), p. 722 at p. 734.

75. L. Henkin, "Kosovo and the Law of 'Humanitarian Intervention,'" American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, 1999, p. 824 at p. 827.