Memoirs of the 3rd Anniversary - Historial de revisiones

MemoriasIEH en 21:51 11 jul 2012

2012-07-11T21:51:10Z

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	== I. LA GUAJIRA/NORTH ~~CESAR1~~ ==		== I. LA GUAJIRA/NORTH CESAR<ref /> ==

	[[Image:La Guajira-Nort Cesar.jpg\|422x572px\|421.5x571.5px]]		[[Image:La Guajira-Nort Cesar.jpg\|422x572px\|421.5x571.5px]]
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	''1. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>2. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. <br>3. UNHCHR, 2012, p.14.<br>4. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>5. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>6. Report on Human Rights in Norte de Santander: Right to Life and Physical Integrity, National NGO Progresar, 2012.<br>7. Special Report on the increase of “False Positives”, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), 2011.<br>8. Report on Food Security, regional field office of the World Food Program, 2011.''<br><br>		''1. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>2. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. <br>3. UNHCHR, 2012, p.14.<br>4. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>5. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>6. Report on Human Rights in Norte de Santander: Right to Life and Physical Integrity, National NGO Progresar, 2012.<br>7. Special Report on the increase of “False Positives”, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), 2011.<br>8. Report on Food Security, regional field office of the World Food Program, 2011.''<br><br>

	== III. BOLIVAR (MONTES DE MARIA) ==		== III. BOLIVAR (MONTES DE MARIA) ==
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	''1. Presence of new NSAGs, Urabeños, ERPAC (formally surrendered to justice on December 2011) and Paisas, has been demonstrated in 9 of the 15 municipalities of Montes de María. Another such group, Rastrojos, was detected in San Onofre. The FARC retreated to remote areas after the death of alias ‘Martín Caballero’ in October 2007, but they are now reorganising.<br>2. Given the perpetuation of conflict dynamics in the zone, these purchases are often enforced through varying levels of intimidation violence, or exploit conflict- induced drops in land values to accumulate real estate far below its “real value”.<br>3. Information provided by network of victims’ leaders.<br>4. Assassinations have concentrated in the municipalities of San Onofre, María Labaja, El Carmen de Bolívar, Ovejas, and San Jacinto. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 5.<br>5. Examples of this include the transversal highway from the west and oil exploitation in Tolú Viejo.''		''1. Presence of new NSAGs, Urabeños, ERPAC (formally surrendered to justice on December 2011) and Paisas, has been demonstrated in 9 of the 15 municipalities of Montes de María. Another such group, Rastrojos, was detected in San Onofre. The FARC retreated to remote areas after the death of alias ‘Martín Caballero’ in October 2007, but they are now reorganising.<br>2. Given the perpetuation of conflict dynamics in the zone, these purchases are often enforced through varying levels of intimidation violence, or exploit conflict- induced drops in land values to accumulate real estate far below its “real value”.<br>3. Information provided by network of victims’ leaders.<br>4. Assassinations have concentrated in the municipalities of San Onofre, María Labaja, El Carmen de Bolívar, Ovejas, and San Jacinto. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 5.<br>5. Examples of this include the transversal highway from the west and oil exploitation in Tolú Viejo.''

			<br>

	== IV. MAGDALENA MEDIO ==		== IV. MAGDALENA MEDIO ==

	~~[[Image:Magdalena_Medio.jpg\|420x570px]]~~

			[[Image:Magdalena Medio.jpg\|420x570px]]

			<br>

	The region constitutes a strategic corridor for drug trafficking, with numerous key routes. It also concentrates significant coca crops, particularly in parts of Antioquia and southern Bolivar.1 The presence of non-food agribusiness, such as palm and mining, generates a series of social conflicts, particularly due to the confrontation and competition over land uses.<br>Both the FARC and ELN have historically held a strong presence in the region, but recent confrontations have been rare. Since the 1960s, the FARC has been present in southern Magdalena Medio, including not only rural areas, but also the metropolitan areas of Barrancabermeja and Bucaramanga.2 To cover their retreat from some areas, the FARC has planted APM in the municipality of Carmén de Chucurí and the township of El Toboso (Santander), where de-mining operations are taking place.3<br>The ELN has concentrated in northern Magdalena Medio, especially in the junction between southern Cesar and Santander departments, and southern Bolivar (the mountain range of San Lucas has been a historic bastion for the group).4<br>The region was a key landscape of paramilitary consolidation since the 1980’s, due to the support of some large landholders, businesspersons and cattle ranchers, who sought to counteract the pressure from guerrillas, as well as rural resident organizations mobilizing around land issues.5<br>Since the 1990’s, there have been a series of rural resident mobilizations against paramilitarism and proposals for citizen assemblies for territorial ordering, highlighting a high degree of community organization.6 In August 2011, rural resident, afro- descendant and indigenous community members gathered in Barrancabermeja for the event “Dialogue is the Route”, which pressed for humanitarian accords and a negotiated solution for the armed conflict.7<br>During recent years, post-demobilization groups, chiefly Urabeños, Águilas Negras and Rastrojos, have played a role in the continuation of the armed conflict in the region.8 These groups have sought to control coca cultivation zones and drug trafficking routes, and have relied on licit and illicit activities, including contraband, gold mining and extortion, in order to finance their operations.9<br>In addition to commercial activities, these groups have engaged in serious lbreaches of human rights and humanitarian law, including forced displacement, threats against community leaders and organizations, and forced recruitment.10 Demobilized<br>paramilitaries and minors have been pressed, sometimes by force, to join these new groups,11 thus undermining the reintegration process. According to NGO Corporación Compromiso, during the first six months of 2011, 49 cases of serious human rights violations, 38 of socio-political violence, and 12 of humanitarian law violations, were registered throughout the department of Santander (part of which forms part of Magdalena Medio).12 Of the serious human rights violations, post-demobilization groups perpetrated 90 per cent.13		The region constitutes a strategic corridor for drug trafficking, with numerous key routes. It also concentrates significant coca crops, particularly in parts of Antioquia and southern Bolivar.1 The presence of non-food agribusiness, such as palm and mining, generates a series of social conflicts, particularly due to the confrontation and competition over land uses.<br>Both the FARC and ELN have historically held a strong presence in the region, but recent confrontations have been rare. Since the 1960s, the FARC has been present in southern Magdalena Medio, including not only rural areas, but also the metropolitan areas of Barrancabermeja and Bucaramanga.2 To cover their retreat from some areas, the FARC has planted APM in the municipality of Carmén de Chucurí and the township of El Toboso (Santander), where de-mining operations are taking place.3<br>The ELN has concentrated in northern Magdalena Medio, especially in the junction between southern Cesar and Santander departments, and southern Bolivar (the mountain range of San Lucas has been a historic bastion for the group).4<br>The region was a key landscape of paramilitary consolidation since the 1980’s, due to the support of some large landholders, businesspersons and cattle ranchers, who sought to counteract the pressure from guerrillas, as well as rural resident organizations mobilizing around land issues.5<br>Since the 1990’s, there have been a series of rural resident mobilizations against paramilitarism and proposals for citizen assemblies for territorial ordering, highlighting a high degree of community organization.6 In August 2011, rural resident, afro- descendant and indigenous community members gathered in Barrancabermeja for the event “Dialogue is the Route”, which pressed for humanitarian accords and a negotiated solution for the armed conflict.7<br>During recent years, post-demobilization groups, chiefly Urabeños, Águilas Negras and Rastrojos, have played a role in the continuation of the armed conflict in the region.8 These groups have sought to control coca cultivation zones and drug trafficking routes, and have relied on licit and illicit activities, including contraband, gold mining and extortion, in order to finance their operations.9<br>In addition to commercial activities, these groups have engaged in serious lbreaches of human rights and humanitarian law, including forced displacement, threats against community leaders and organizations, and forced recruitment.10 Demobilized<br>paramilitaries and minors have been pressed, sometimes by force, to join these new groups,11 thus undermining the reintegration process. According to NGO Corporación Compromiso, during the first six months of 2011, 49 cases of serious human rights violations, 38 of socio-political violence, and 12 of humanitarian law violations, were registered throughout the department of Santander (part of which forms part of Magdalena Medio).12 Of the serious human rights violations, post-demobilization groups perpetrated 90 per cent.13

MemoriasIEH en 19:19 11 jul 2012

2012-07-11T19:19:01Z

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	1. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>2. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. <br>3. UNHCHR, 2012, p.14.<br>4. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>5. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>6. Report on Human Rights in Norte de Santander: Right to Life and Physical Integrity, National NGO Progresar, 2012.<br>7. Special Report on the increase of “False Positives”, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), 2011.<br>8. Report on Food Security, regional field office of the World Food Program, 2011.<br><br>		''1. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>2. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. <br>3. UNHCHR, 2012, p.14.<br>4. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>5. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>6. Report on Human Rights in Norte de Santander: Right to Life and Physical Integrity, National NGO Progresar, 2012.<br>7. Special Report on the increase of “False Positives”, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), 2011.<br>8. Report on Food Security, regional field office of the World Food Program, 2011.''<br><br>

	== III. BOLIVAR (MONTES DE MARIA) ==		== III. BOLIVAR (MONTES DE MARIA) ==

MemoriasIEH en 19:18 11 jul 2012

2012-07-11T19:18:23Z

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	''1. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. 2. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. 3. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 14.<br>4. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>5. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>6. Report on Human Rights in Norte de Santander: Right to Life and Physical Integrity, National NGO Progresar, 2012.<br>7. Special Report on the increase of “False Positives”, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), 2011.<br>8. Report on Food Security, regional field office of the World Food Program, 2011.''<br><br>		1. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>2. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. <br>3. UNHCHR, 2012, p.14.<br>4. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>5. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>6. Report on Human Rights in Norte de Santander: Right to Life and Physical Integrity, National NGO Progresar, 2012.<br>7. Special Report on the increase of “False Positives”, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), 2011.<br>8. Report on Food Security, regional field office of the World Food Program, 2011.<br><br>

	== III. BOLIVAR (MONTES DE MARIA) ==		== III. BOLIVAR (MONTES DE MARIA) ==

MemoriasIEH en 17:52 11 jul 2012

2012-07-11T17:52:42Z

← Revisión anterior		Revisión del 17:52 11 jul 2012
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	''1. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. 2. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. 3. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 14.<br>4. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>5. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>6. Report on Human Rights in Norte de Santander: Right to Life and Physical Integrity, National NGO Progresar, 2012.<br>7. Special Report on the increase of “False Positives”, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), 2011.<br>8. Report on Food Security, regional field office of the World Food Program, 2011.''<br><br>		''1. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. 2. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. 3. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 14.<br>4. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>5. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>6. Report on Human Rights in Norte de Santander: Right to Life and Physical Integrity, National NGO Progresar, 2012.<br>7. Special Report on the increase of “False Positives”, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), 2011.<br>8. Report on Food Security, regional field office of the World Food Program, 2011.''<br><br>

	== III. BOLIVAR (MONTES DE MARIA) ==		== III. BOLIVAR (MONTES DE MARIA) ==

	[[Image:~~Bolivar_Montes_de_Maria~~.jpg\|420x570px]]		[[Image:Bolivar Montes de Maria.jpg\|420x570px]]

			<br>

			Montes de María has historically been treated as a “laboratory”, combining the implementation of the National Consolidation Plan, the Victims’ Law and Land Restitution, rural resident reserve and rural development areas. The zone also presents all major actors of the armed conflict, each with a territorial control exercised over a certain part of society.1<br>The military is building capacity among youth for the prevention of forced recruitment and child exploitation, as well organizing communities around the land restitution process. It is of concern that the government remains silent regarding numerous IHL infractions and IHRL violations in the zone.<br>Despite highly visible public policies in Montes de María, massive land purchases2 and the “drop-by-drop” displacement phenomenon are still ongoing, though they are often not officially reported and thus “invisible”. Overall, there were an estimated 240 persons displaced from the region in 2010.3<br>Local capacities have been strengthened thanks to the establishment of a rural resident reserve zone (community self-protection process) with an Impulse Committee and Rural resident Reserve Board, which is involved in resolving boundary disputes between rural residents. In addition to the network of victims’ leaders, there are strong networks of civil society organizations. This was illustrated by the protests that managed to influence public policies in defense of their rights. However, it is troubling that non-state armed groups have confronted these civil society networks, resulting in the killing of 50 persons in the zone during 2010.4<br>Though rural resident reserve zones exist as a strategy to curb mono-crop cultivation and massive land acquisition, mega- projects and plans for the exploitation of natural resources continue advancing.5 Even while rural resident reserve and rural development zones are promoted, large plots of land are being distributed to extractive industries and monocultures, threatening the territorial and social integrity of the local communities.

	Montes de María has historically been treated as a “laboratory”, combining the implementation of the National Consolidation Plan, the Victims’ Law and Land Restitution, rural resident reserve and rural development areas. The zone also presents all major actors of the armed conflict, each with a territorial control exercised over a certain part of society.1<br>The military is building capacity among youth for the prevention of forced recruitment and child exploitation, as well organizing communities around the land restitution process. It is of concern that the government remains silent regarding numerous IHL infractions and IHRL violations in the zone.<br>Despite highly visible public policies in Montes de María, massive land purchases2 and the “drop-by-drop” displacement phenomenon are still ongoing, though they are often not officially reported and thus “invisible”. Overall, there were an estimated 240 persons displaced from the region in 2010.3<br>Local capacities have been strengthened thanks to the establishment of a rural resident reserve zone (community self-protection process) with an Impulse Committee and Rural resident Reserve Board, which is involved in resolving boundary disputes between rural residents. In addition to the network of victims’ leaders, there are strong networks of civil society organizations. This was illustrated by the protests that managed to influence public policies in defense of their rights. However, it is troubling that non-state armed groups have confronted these civil society networks, resulting in the killing of 50 persons in the zone during 2010.4<br>Though rural resident reserve zones exist as a strategy to curb mono-crop cultivation and massive land acquisition, mega- projects and plans for the exploitation of natural resources continue advancing.5 Even while rural resident reserve and rural development zones are promoted, large plots of land are being distributed to extractive industries and monocultures, threatening the territorial and social integrity of the local communities.		<br>

			''1. Presence of new NSAGs, Urabeños, ERPAC (formally surrendered to justice on December 2011) and Paisas, has been demonstrated in 9 of the 15 municipalities of Montes de María. Another such group, Rastrojos, was detected in San Onofre. The FARC retreated to remote areas after the death of alias ‘Martín Caballero’ in October 2007, but they are now reorganising.<br>2. Given the perpetuation of conflict dynamics in the zone, these purchases are often enforced through varying levels of intimidation violence, or exploit conflict- induced drops in land values to accumulate real estate far below its “real value”.<br>3. Information provided by network of victims’ leaders.<br>4. Assassinations have concentrated in the municipalities of San Onofre, María Labaja, El Carmen de Bolívar, Ovejas, and San Jacinto. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 5.<br>5. Examples of this include the transversal highway from the west and oil exploitation in Tolú Viejo.''


	''1~~. Presence~~ of ~~new NSAGs~~, ~~Urabeños~~, ~~ERPAC (formally surrendered~~ to ~~justice on December 2011)~~ and ~~Paisas~~, has been ~~demonstrated~~ in 9 of the ~~15 municipalities~~ of ~~Montes~~ de ~~María~~. ~~Another such group~~, ~~Rastrojos~~, ~~was detected in~~ San ~~Onofre~~. The ~~FARC retreated~~ to ~~remote areas after~~ the ~~death~~ of ~~alias ‘Martín Caballero’ in October 2007~~, ~~but they are now reorganising~~.<br>~~2. Given~~ the ~~perpetuation~~ of ~~conflict dynamics in the zone~~, ~~these purchases are often enforced through varying levels~~ of ~~intimidation violence~~, ~~or exploit conflict~~- ~~induced drops~~ in ~~land values to accumulate real estate far below its “real value”~~.<br>3. ~~Information provided by network of victims’ leaders~~.<br>~~4. Assassinations~~ have ~~concentrated~~ in ~~the municipalities~~ of ~~San Onofre~~, ~~María Labaja~~, ~~El Carmen de Bolívar, Ovejas~~, and ~~San Jacinto. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 5~~.<br>5. ~~Examples~~ of ~~this include~~ the ~~transversal highway from~~ the ~~west and oil exploitation in Tolú Viejo~~.''		== IV. MAGDALENA MEDIO ==

			[[Image:Magdalena_Medio.jpg\|420x570px]]



			The region constitutes a strategic corridor for drug trafficking, with numerous key routes. It also concentrates significant coca crops, particularly in parts of Antioquia and southern Bolivar.1 The presence of non-food agribusiness, such as palm and mining, generates a series of social conflicts, particularly due to the confrontation and competition over land uses.<br>Both the FARC and ELN have historically held a strong presence in the region, but recent confrontations have been rare. Since the 1960s, the FARC has been present in southern Magdalena Medio, including not only rural areas, but also the metropolitan areas of Barrancabermeja and Bucaramanga.2 To cover their retreat from some areas, the FARC has planted APM in the municipality of Carmén de Chucurí and the township of El Toboso (Santander), where de-mining operations are taking place.3<br>The ELN has concentrated in northern Magdalena Medio, especially in the junction between southern Cesar and Santander departments, and southern Bolivar (the mountain range of San Lucas has been a historic bastion for the group).4<br>The region was a key landscape of paramilitary consolidation since the 1980’s, due to the support of some large landholders, businesspersons and cattle ranchers, who sought to counteract the pressure from guerrillas, as well as rural resident organizations mobilizing around land issues.5<br>Since the 1990’s, there have been a series of rural resident mobilizations against paramilitarism and proposals for citizen assemblies for territorial ordering, highlighting a high degree of community organization.6 In August 2011, rural resident, afro- descendant and indigenous community members gathered in Barrancabermeja for the event “Dialogue is the Route”, which pressed for humanitarian accords and a negotiated solution for the armed conflict.7<br>During recent years, post-demobilization groups, chiefly Urabeños, Águilas Negras and Rastrojos, have played a role in the continuation of the armed conflict in the region.8 These groups have sought to control coca cultivation zones and drug trafficking routes, and have relied on licit and illicit activities, including contraband, gold mining and extortion, in order to finance their operations.9<br>In addition to commercial activities, these groups have engaged in serious lbreaches of human rights and humanitarian law, including forced displacement, threats against community leaders and organizations, and forced recruitment.10 Demobilized<br>paramilitaries and minors have been pressed, sometimes by force, to join these new groups,11 thus undermining the reintegration process. According to NGO Corporación Compromiso, during the first six months of 2011, 49 cases of serious human rights violations, 38 of socio-political violence, and 12 of humanitarian law violations, were registered throughout the department of Santander (part of which forms part of Magdalena Medio).12 Of the serious human rights violations, post-demobilization groups perpetrated 90 per cent.13

MemoriasIEH en 17:42 11 jul 2012

2012-07-11T17:42:22Z

← Revisión anterior		Revisión del 17:42 11 jul 2012
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	''1. While the regional statistics and map refer to the departments of Guajira and Cesar<br>as a whole, the information below focuses on conflict and humanitarian dynamics in<br>Guajira and the northern region of Cesar.<br>2. Arias, Gerson, “Pasado y Presente del entorno de seguridad en La Guajira”,<br>Fundación Ideas para la Paz and VerdadAbierta.com, Bogotá, 27 October 2010,<br>Presentation at Event.<br>3. Reyes Posada, Alejandro. 2008. Guerreros y Campesinos: El despojo de la tierra en<br>Colombia. Bogotá: Fescol, Grupo Editorial Norma, p. 208.<br>4. As asserted by UNHCHR, impunity is a “structural problem affecting the full<br>enjoyment of rights.” “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human<br>Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia”, UNHCHR, 31 January 2012.<br>5. Some Army officers continue to deny extrajudicial executions, including “false<br>positives”, instead discrediting the justice system and victims. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 8.<br>6. “Minería en Colombia: ¿a qué precio?, Boletín informativo no. 18 PBI Colombia”,<br>Peace Brigades International, Bogotá, November 2011, p. 32<br>7. Ibid.<br>8. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 5.<br>9. Notorious paramilitary Jorge 40 allied with José María Barros Ipuana and José María<br>Gómez to establish this front, but resistance by traditional indigenous structures has<br>been fierce and sometimes violent. “Dinámica Reciente de la Confrontación Armada<br>en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta”, Observatorio de Derechos Humanos de la<br>Vicepresidencia, February 2006.<br>10. The massacre on April 18, 2004 in Bahía Portete (Guajira) was a targeted attack<br>on women with profound implications on a relatively populous, but historically<br>threatened, indigenous minority. It simultaneously exemplifies the highly functional<br>use of violence against women, and the role of deep-seated institutional and societal<br>discrimination against marginalized communities. The massacre not only threatened<br>the historical, cultural and mythical patrimony of the community, but also its ethnic<br>survival. “La Masacre de Bahía Portete: Mujeres Wayuu en la mira”, CNRR, Bogotá,<br>2010.''<br>		''1. While the regional statistics and map refer to the departments of Guajira and Cesar<br>as a whole, the information below focuses on conflict and humanitarian dynamics in<br>Guajira and the northern region of Cesar.<br>2. Arias, Gerson, “Pasado y Presente del entorno de seguridad en La Guajira”,<br>Fundación Ideas para la Paz and VerdadAbierta.com, Bogotá, 27 October 2010,<br>Presentation at Event.<br>3. Reyes Posada, Alejandro. 2008. Guerreros y Campesinos: El despojo de la tierra en<br>Colombia. Bogotá: Fescol, Grupo Editorial Norma, p. 208.<br>4. As asserted by UNHCHR, impunity is a “structural problem affecting the full<br>enjoyment of rights.” “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human<br>Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia”, UNHCHR, 31 January 2012.<br>5. Some Army officers continue to deny extrajudicial executions, including “false<br>positives”, instead discrediting the justice system and victims. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 8.<br>6. “Minería en Colombia: ¿a qué precio?, Boletín informativo no. 18 PBI Colombia”,<br>Peace Brigades International, Bogotá, November 2011, p. 32<br>7. Ibid.<br>8. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 5.<br>9. Notorious paramilitary Jorge 40 allied with José María Barros Ipuana and José María<br>Gómez to establish this front, but resistance by traditional indigenous structures has<br>been fierce and sometimes violent. “Dinámica Reciente de la Confrontación Armada<br>en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta”, Observatorio de Derechos Humanos de la<br>Vicepresidencia, February 2006.<br>10. The massacre on April 18, 2004 in Bahía Portete (Guajira) was a targeted attack<br>on women with profound implications on a relatively populous, but historically<br>threatened, indigenous minority. It simultaneously exemplifies the highly functional<br>use of violence against women, and the role of deep-seated institutional and societal<br>discrimination against marginalized communities. The massacre not only threatened<br>the historical, cultural and mythical patrimony of the community, but also its ethnic<br>survival. “La Masacre de Bahía Portete: Mujeres Wayuu en la mira”, CNRR, Bogotá,<br>2010.''<br>

	== II. NORTE DE SANTANDER  ==		== II. NORTE DE SANTANDER  ==

	[[Image:Norte de Santander.jpg\|420x570px]]		[[Image:Norte de Santander.jpg\|420x570px]]

	<br>The Department has a geostrategic location, which has made it a key corridor for drug and human trafficking, as well as arms and fuel smuggling. The high presence of non-state armed groups and criminal organizations in the border areas create security risks that impact the civilian population and exacerbate humanitarian needs. Over the past two years there have been massacres, homicides, kidnappings and human trafficking throughout the zone.1<br>The end of the armed conflict in the region remains elusive, particularly taking into account the intensity of the armed conflict along the border with Venezuela. Non-state armed groups and criminal organizations have reportedly formed alliances to exploit drug trafficking. Manual drug crop eradication processes take place throughout the Catatumbo area of Norte de Santander, leading to constant protests, armed confrontations and an increase in the use of landmines. These events lead to displacement risk and affect local food security.2<br>Children and teens are vulnerable to recruitment by illegal armed groups, particularly in Catatumbo and the Cúcuta Metropolitan area, and prevention policies need to be further developed and implemented. There are two reports of threats by the FARC to recruit 7-year-old boys.3 There are periodic trainings and minors reportedly participate in isolated operations. The Motilón-Barí community is considered to be an indigenous community at high- risk due to the conflict.4 Another concern is human trafficking, as well as high SGBV and HIV/AIDS rates among IDPs.		<br>The Department has a geostrategic location, which has made it a key corridor for drug and human trafficking, as well as arms and fuel smuggling. The high presence of non-state armed groups and criminal organizations in the border areas create security risks that impact the civilian population and exacerbate humanitarian needs. Over the past two years there have been massacres, homicides, kidnappings and human trafficking throughout the zone.1<br>The end of the armed conflict in the region remains elusive, particularly taking into account the intensity of the armed conflict along the border with Venezuela. Non-state armed groups and criminal organizations have reportedly formed alliances to exploit drug trafficking. Manual drug crop eradication processes take place throughout the Catatumbo area of Norte de Santander, leading to constant protests, armed confrontations and an increase in the use of landmines. These events lead to displacement risk and affect local food security.2<br>Children and teens are vulnerable to recruitment by illegal armed groups, particularly in Catatumbo and the Cúcuta Metropolitan area, and prevention policies need to be further developed and implemented. There are two reports of threats by the FARC to recruit 7-year-old boys.3 There are periodic trainings and minors reportedly participate in isolated operations. The Motilón-Barí community is considered to be an indigenous community at high- risk due to the conflict.4 Another concern is human trafficking, as well as high SGBV and HIV/AIDS rates among IDPs.

	<br>In 2010, armed actions increased to 62 reported events related to the armed conflict, compared to 47 in 2009. During 2010, 27 out of the 40 municipalities, representing 67.5 per cent of the Department, were affected by armed or violent actions related to conflict.5 According to the local NGO Progresar, there were 60 reported cases of forced disappearance in 2010, 90 per cent of which were concentrated in the municipalities of Cúcuta and Villa del Rosario.6 Since 2008, Human Rights and IDP organization leaders have reported numerous threats.7 Non-state armed groups have threatened former government employees and candidates to public office.<br>The threat of displacement is mostly individual, though there are risks of mass displacement in areas such as Catatumbo. In 2010, the accumulated number of IDPs reached 79,851 expelled and 101,654 received. There is an under-registry, with a high percentage of ‘non-inclusion’ of IDP declarations on the part of former Acción Social, including non-registry of “inter-vereda”<br>28 (rural displacement within a municipality) or inter-urban displacement, which cannot be declared according to Law 387 or are invisible; flight to other regions or across the Venezuelan border.<br>The 2010-2011 rainy season left a total of 61,746 persons affected in Norte de Santander, and caused flooding and landslides in 80 per cent of Department. The Gramalote municipality was entirely destroyed and must be re-located due to geological fissures. During 2011, the local authorities reported 3,321 new families affected by the rainy season. While adults consumed three daily food rations, children consumed just two.8 The WFP delivered 8,249 food rations to 2,749 families, 13,745 people. The National Response Organization Colombia Humanitaria has given monetary resources to respond to the needs identified on food, shelter and sanitation.<br>The rainy season also led to the collapse of 71 per cent (1,017 of 1,436km of roads) of the secondary road system, including the road infrastructure connecting the capital, Cúcuta. This resulted not only in the isolation of the capital, but also in constraints for humanitarian access.<br>APM/UXO presence also hinders access and mobility, not only for the local population, but also for humanitarian organizations. In 2010 there were 43 APM/UXO events, killing one civilian and 31 military personnel. The Department has among the top five numbers of victims of these devices in Colombia. The risk is exacerbated as guerrillas use these devices in their attempt to block the entrance of manual eradicators of coca crops in their zones of influence.		<br>In 2010, armed actions increased to 62 reported events related to the armed conflict, compared to 47 in 2009. During 2010, 27 out of the 40 municipalities, representing 67.5 per cent of the Department, were affected by armed or violent actions related to conflict.5 According to the local NGO Progresar, there were 60 reported cases of forced disappearance in 2010, 90 per cent of which were concentrated in the municipalities of Cúcuta and Villa del Rosario.6 Since 2008, Human Rights and IDP organization leaders have reported numerous threats.7 Non-state armed groups have threatened former government employees and candidates to public office.<br>The threat of displacement is mostly individual, though there are risks of mass displacement in areas such as Catatumbo. In 2010, the accumulated number of IDPs reached 79,851 expelled and 101,654 received. There is an under-registry, with a high percentage of ‘non-inclusion’ of IDP declarations on the part of former Acción Social, including non-registry of “inter-vereda”<br>28 (rural displacement within a municipality) or inter-urban displacement, which cannot be declared according to Law 387 or are invisible; flight to other regions or across the Venezuelan border.<br>The 2010-2011 rainy season left a total of 61,746 persons affected in Norte de Santander, and caused flooding and landslides in 80 per cent of Department. The Gramalote municipality was entirely destroyed and must be re-located due to geological fissures. During 2011, the local authorities reported 3,321 new families affected by the rainy season. While adults consumed three daily food rations, children consumed just two.8 The WFP delivered 8,249 food rations to 2,749 families, 13,745 people. The National Response Organization Colombia Humanitaria has given monetary resources to respond to the needs identified on food, shelter and sanitation.<br>The rainy season also led to the collapse of 71 per cent (1,017 of 1,436km of roads) of the secondary road system, including the road infrastructure connecting the capital, Cúcuta. This resulted not only in the isolation of the capital, but also in constraints for humanitarian access.<br>APM/UXO presence also hinders access and mobility, not only for the local population, but also for humanitarian organizations. In 2010 there were 43 APM/UXO events, killing one civilian and 31 military personnel. The Department has among the top five numbers of victims of these devices in Colombia. The risk is exacerbated as guerrillas use these devices in their attempt to block the entrance of manual eradicators of coca crops in their zones of influence.
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	''1. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. 2. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. 3. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 14.<br>4. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>5. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>6. Report on Human Rights in Norte de Santander: Right to Life and Physical Integrity, National NGO Progresar, 2012.<br>7. Special Report on the increase of “False Positives”, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), 2011.<br>8. Report on Food Security, regional field office of the World Food Program, 2011.''<br><br>		''1. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. 2. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. 3. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 14.<br>4. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>5. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>6. Report on Human Rights in Norte de Santander: Right to Life and Physical Integrity, National NGO Progresar, 2012.<br>7. Special Report on the increase of “False Positives”, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), 2011.<br>8. Report on Food Security, regional field office of the World Food Program, 2011.''<br><br>

			== III. BOLIVAR (MONTES DE MARIA) ==

			[[Image:Bolivar_Montes_de_Maria.jpg\|420x570px]]



			Montes de María has historically been treated as a “laboratory”, combining the implementation of the National Consolidation Plan, the Victims’ Law and Land Restitution, rural resident reserve and rural development areas. The zone also presents all major actors of the armed conflict, each with a territorial control exercised over a certain part of society.1<br>The military is building capacity among youth for the prevention of forced recruitment and child exploitation, as well organizing communities around the land restitution process. It is of concern that the government remains silent regarding numerous IHL infractions and IHRL violations in the zone.<br>Despite highly visible public policies in Montes de María, massive land purchases2 and the “drop-by-drop” displacement phenomenon are still ongoing, though they are often not officially reported and thus “invisible”. Overall, there were an estimated 240 persons displaced from the region in 2010.3<br>Local capacities have been strengthened thanks to the establishment of a rural resident reserve zone (community self-protection process) with an Impulse Committee and Rural resident Reserve Board, which is involved in resolving boundary disputes between rural residents. In addition to the network of victims’ leaders, there are strong networks of civil society organizations. This was illustrated by the protests that managed to influence public policies in defense of their rights. However, it is troubling that non-state armed groups have confronted these civil society networks, resulting in the killing of 50 persons in the zone during 2010.4<br>Though rural resident reserve zones exist as a strategy to curb mono-crop cultivation and massive land acquisition, mega- projects and plans for the exploitation of natural resources continue advancing.5 Even while rural resident reserve and rural development zones are promoted, large plots of land are being distributed to extractive industries and monocultures, threatening the territorial and social integrity of the local communities.



			''1. Presence of new NSAGs, Urabeños, ERPAC (formally surrendered to justice on December 2011) and Paisas, has been demonstrated in 9 of the 15 municipalities of Montes de María. Another such group, Rastrojos, was detected in San Onofre. The FARC retreated to remote areas after the death of alias ‘Martín Caballero’ in October 2007, but they are now reorganising.<br>2. Given the perpetuation of conflict dynamics in the zone, these purchases are often enforced through varying levels of intimidation violence, or exploit conflict- induced drops in land values to accumulate real estate far below its “real value”.<br>3. Information provided by network of victims’ leaders.<br>4. Assassinations have concentrated in the municipalities of San Onofre, María Labaja, El Carmen de Bolívar, Ovejas, and San Jacinto. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 5.<br>5. Examples of this include the transversal highway from the west and oil exploitation in Tolú Viejo.''

MemoriasIEH en 17:29 11 jul 2012

2012-07-11T17:29:52Z

← Revisión anterior		Revisión del 17:29 11 jul 2012
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	''1. While the regional statistics and map refer to the departments of Guajira and Cesar<br>as a whole, the information below focuses on conflict and humanitarian dynamics in<br>Guajira and the northern region of Cesar.<br>2. Arias, Gerson, “Pasado y Presente del entorno de seguridad en La Guajira”,<br>Fundación Ideas para la Paz and VerdadAbierta.com, Bogotá, 27 October 2010,<br>Presentation at Event.<br>3. Reyes Posada, Alejandro. 2008. Guerreros y Campesinos: El despojo de la tierra en<br>Colombia. Bogotá: Fescol, Grupo Editorial Norma, p. 208.<br>4. As asserted by UNHCHR, impunity is a “structural problem affecting the full<br>enjoyment of rights.” “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human<br>Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia”, UNHCHR, 31 January 2012.<br>5. Some Army officers continue to deny extrajudicial executions, including “false<br>positives”, instead discrediting the justice system and victims. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 8.<br>6. “Minería en Colombia: ¿a qué precio?, Boletín informativo no. 18 PBI Colombia”,<br>Peace Brigades International, Bogotá, November 2011, p. 32<br>7. Ibid.<br>8. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 5.<br>9. Notorious paramilitary Jorge 40 allied with José María Barros Ipuana and José María<br>Gómez to establish this front, but resistance by traditional indigenous structures has<br>been fierce and sometimes violent. “Dinámica Reciente de la Confrontación Armada<br>en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta”, Observatorio de Derechos Humanos de la<br>Vicepresidencia, February 2006.<br>10. The massacre on April 18, 2004 in Bahía Portete (Guajira) was a targeted attack<br>on women with profound implications on a relatively populous, but historically<br>threatened, indigenous minority. It simultaneously exemplifies the highly functional<br>use of violence against women, and the role of deep-seated institutional and societal<br>discrimination against marginalized communities. The massacre not only threatened<br>the historical, cultural and mythical patrimony of the community, but also its ethnic<br>survival. “La Masacre de Bahía Portete: Mujeres Wayuu en la mira”, CNRR, Bogotá,<br>2010.''<br>		''1. While the regional statistics and map refer to the departments of Guajira and Cesar<br>as a whole, the information below focuses on conflict and humanitarian dynamics in<br>Guajira and the northern region of Cesar.<br>2. Arias, Gerson, “Pasado y Presente del entorno de seguridad en La Guajira”,<br>Fundación Ideas para la Paz and VerdadAbierta.com, Bogotá, 27 October 2010,<br>Presentation at Event.<br>3. Reyes Posada, Alejandro. 2008. Guerreros y Campesinos: El despojo de la tierra en<br>Colombia. Bogotá: Fescol, Grupo Editorial Norma, p. 208.<br>4. As asserted by UNHCHR, impunity is a “structural problem affecting the full<br>enjoyment of rights.” “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human<br>Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia”, UNHCHR, 31 January 2012.<br>5. Some Army officers continue to deny extrajudicial executions, including “false<br>positives”, instead discrediting the justice system and victims. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 8.<br>6. “Minería en Colombia: ¿a qué precio?, Boletín informativo no. 18 PBI Colombia”,<br>Peace Brigades International, Bogotá, November 2011, p. 32<br>7. Ibid.<br>8. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 5.<br>9. Notorious paramilitary Jorge 40 allied with José María Barros Ipuana and José María<br>Gómez to establish this front, but resistance by traditional indigenous structures has<br>been fierce and sometimes violent. “Dinámica Reciente de la Confrontación Armada<br>en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta”, Observatorio de Derechos Humanos de la<br>Vicepresidencia, February 2006.<br>10. The massacre on April 18, 2004 in Bahía Portete (Guajira) was a targeted attack<br>on women with profound implications on a relatively populous, but historically<br>threatened, indigenous minority. It simultaneously exemplifies the highly functional<br>use of violence against women, and the role of deep-seated institutional and societal<br>discrimination against marginalized communities. The massacre not only threatened<br>the historical, cultural and mythical patrimony of the community, but also its ethnic<br>survival. “La Masacre de Bahía Portete: Mujeres Wayuu en la mira”, CNRR, Bogotá,<br>2010.''<br>

	II. NORTE DE SANTANDER ==		== II. NORTE DE SANTANDER  ==

	[[Image:~~Norte_de_Santander~~.jpg\|420x570px]]		[[Image:Norte de Santander.jpg\|420x570px]]

	<br>The Department has a geostrategic location, which has made it a key corridor for drug and human trafficking, as well as arms and fuel smuggling. The high presence of non-state armed groups and criminal organizations in the border areas create security risks that impact the civilian population and exacerbate humanitarian needs. Over the past two years there have been massacres, homicides, kidnappings and human trafficking throughout the zone.1<br>The end of the armed conflict in the region remains elusive, particularly taking into account the intensity of the armed conflict along the border with Venezuela. Non-state armed groups and criminal organizations have reportedly formed alliances to exploit drug trafficking. Manual drug crop eradication processes take place throughout the Catatumbo area of Norte de Santander, leading to constant protests, armed confrontations and an increase in the use of landmines. These events lead to displacement risk and affect local food security.2<br>Children and teens are vulnerable to recruitment by illegal armed groups, particularly in Catatumbo and the Cúcuta Metropolitan area, and prevention policies need to be further developed and implemented. There are two reports of threats by the FARC to recruit 7-year-old boys.3 There are periodic trainings and minors reportedly participate in isolated operations. The Motilón-Barí community is considered to be an indigenous community at high- risk due to the conflict.4 Another concern is human trafficking, as well as high SGBV and HIV/AIDS rates among IDPs.<br>In 2010, armed actions increased to 62 reported events related to the armed conflict, compared to 47 in 2009. During 2010, 27 out of the 40 municipalities, representing 67.5 per cent of the Department, were affected by armed or violent actions related to conflict.5 According to the local NGO Progresar, there were 60 reported cases of forced disappearance in 2010, 90 per cent of which were concentrated in the municipalities of Cúcuta and Villa del Rosario.6 Since 2008, Human Rights and IDP organization leaders have reported numerous threats.7 Non-state armed groups have threatened former government employees and candidates to public office.<br>The threat of displacement is mostly individual, though there are risks of mass displacement in areas such as Catatumbo. In 2010, the accumulated number of IDPs reached 79,851 expelled and 101,654 received. There is an under-registry, with a high percentage of ‘non-inclusion’ of IDP declarations on the part of former Acción Social, including non-registry of “inter-vereda”<br>28 (rural displacement within a municipality) or inter-urban displacement, which cannot be declared according to Law 387 or are invisible; flight to other regions or across the Venezuelan border.<br>The 2010-2011 rainy season left a total of 61,746 persons affected in Norte de Santander, and caused flooding and landslides in 80 per cent of Department. The Gramalote municipality was entirely destroyed and must be re-located due to geological fissures. During 2011, the local authorities reported 3,321 new families affected by the rainy season. While adults consumed three daily food rations, children consumed just two.8 The WFP delivered 8,249 food rations to 2,749 families, 13,745 people. The National Response Organization Colombia Humanitaria has given monetary resources to respond to the needs identified on food, shelter and sanitation.<br>The rainy season also led to the collapse of 71 per cent (1,017 of 1,436km of roads) of the secondary road system, including the road infrastructure connecting the capital, Cúcuta. This resulted not only in the isolation of the capital, but also in constraints for humanitarian access.<br>APM/UXO presence also hinders access and mobility, not only for the local population, but also for humanitarian organizations. In 2010 there were 43 APM/UXO events, killing one civilian and 31 military personnel. The Department has among the top five numbers of victims of these devices in Colombia. The risk is exacerbated as guerrillas use these devices in their attempt to block the entrance of manual eradicators of coca crops in their zones of influence.		<br>The Department has a geostrategic location, which has made it a key corridor for drug and human trafficking, as well as arms and fuel smuggling. The high presence of non-state armed groups and criminal organizations in the border areas create security risks that impact the civilian population and exacerbate humanitarian needs. Over the past two years there have been massacres, homicides, kidnappings and human trafficking throughout the zone.1<br>The end of the armed conflict in the region remains elusive, particularly taking into account the intensity of the armed conflict along the border with Venezuela. Non-state armed groups and criminal organizations have reportedly formed alliances to exploit drug trafficking. Manual drug crop eradication processes take place throughout the Catatumbo area of Norte de Santander, leading to constant protests, armed confrontations and an increase in the use of landmines. These events lead to displacement risk and affect local food security.2<br>Children and teens are vulnerable to recruitment by illegal armed groups, particularly in Catatumbo and the Cúcuta Metropolitan area, and prevention policies need to be further developed and implemented. There are two reports of threats by the FARC to recruit 7-year-old boys.3 There are periodic trainings and minors reportedly participate in isolated operations. The Motilón-Barí community is considered to be an indigenous community at high- risk due to the conflict.4 Another concern is human trafficking, as well as high SGBV and HIV/AIDS rates among IDPs.

			<br>In 2010, armed actions increased to 62 reported events related to the armed conflict, compared to 47 in 2009. During 2010, 27 out of the 40 municipalities, representing 67.5 per cent of the Department, were affected by armed or violent actions related to conflict.5 According to the local NGO Progresar, there were 60 reported cases of forced disappearance in 2010, 90 per cent of which were concentrated in the municipalities of Cúcuta and Villa del Rosario.6 Since 2008, Human Rights and IDP organization leaders have reported numerous threats.7 Non-state armed groups have threatened former government employees and candidates to public office.<br>The threat of displacement is mostly individual, though there are risks of mass displacement in areas such as Catatumbo. In 2010, the accumulated number of IDPs reached 79,851 expelled and 101,654 received. There is an under-registry, with a high percentage of ‘non-inclusion’ of IDP declarations on the part of former Acción Social, including non-registry of “inter-vereda”<br>28 (rural displacement within a municipality) or inter-urban displacement, which cannot be declared according to Law 387 or are invisible; flight to other regions or across the Venezuelan border.<br>The 2010-2011 rainy season left a total of 61,746 persons affected in Norte de Santander, and caused flooding and landslides in 80 per cent of Department. The Gramalote municipality was entirely destroyed and must be re-located due to geological fissures. During 2011, the local authorities reported 3,321 new families affected by the rainy season. While adults consumed three daily food rations, children consumed just two.8 The WFP delivered 8,249 food rations to 2,749 families, 13,745 people. The National Response Organization Colombia Humanitaria has given monetary resources to respond to the needs identified on food, shelter and sanitation.<br>The rainy season also led to the collapse of 71 per cent (1,017 of 1,436km of roads) of the secondary road system, including the road infrastructure connecting the capital, Cúcuta. This resulted not only in the isolation of the capital, but also in constraints for humanitarian access.<br>APM/UXO presence also hinders access and mobility, not only for the local population, but also for humanitarian organizations. In 2010 there were 43 APM/UXO events, killing one civilian and 31 military personnel. The Department has among the top five numbers of victims of these devices in Colombia. The risk is exacerbated as guerrillas use these devices in their attempt to block the entrance of manual eradicators of coca crops in their zones of influence.

			<br>

	<br>		''1. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. 2. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011. 3. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 14.<br>4. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>5. Information provided by regional field office, OCHA, May 2011.<br>6. Report on Human Rights in Norte de Santander: Right to Life and Physical Integrity, National NGO Progresar, 2012.<br>7. Special Report on the increase of “False Positives”, Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular (CINEP), 2011.<br>8. Report on Food Security, regional field office of the World Food Program, 2011.''<br><br>

MemoriasIEH en 17:25 11 jul 2012

2012-07-11T17:25:57Z

← Revisión anterior		Revisión del 17:25 11 jul 2012
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	= Regional Surveys =		= Regional Surveys =
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	''1. While the regional statistics and map refer to the departments of Guajira and Cesar<br>as a whole, the information below focuses on conflict and humanitarian dynamics in<br>Guajira and the northern region of Cesar.<br>2. Arias, Gerson, “Pasado y Presente del entorno de seguridad en La Guajira”,<br>Fundación Ideas para la Paz and VerdadAbierta.com, Bogotá, 27 October 2010,<br>Presentation at Event.<br>3. Reyes Posada, Alejandro. 2008. Guerreros y Campesinos: El despojo de la tierra en<br>Colombia. Bogotá: Fescol, Grupo Editorial Norma, p. 208.<br>4. As asserted by UNHCHR, impunity is a “structural problem affecting the full<br>enjoyment of rights.” “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human<br>Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia”, UNHCHR, 31 January 2012.<br>5. Some Army officers continue to deny extrajudicial executions, including “false<br>positives”, instead discrediting the justice system and victims. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 8.<br>6. “Minería en Colombia: ¿a qué precio?, Boletín informativo no. 18 PBI Colombia”,<br>Peace Brigades International, Bogotá, November 2011, p. 32<br>7. Ibid.<br>8. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 5.<br>9. Notorious paramilitary Jorge 40 allied with José María Barros Ipuana and José María<br>Gómez to establish this front, but resistance by traditional indigenous structures has<br>been fierce and sometimes violent. “Dinámica Reciente de la Confrontación Armada<br>en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta”, Observatorio de Derechos Humanos de la<br>Vicepresidencia, February 2006.<br>10. The massacre on April 18, 2004 in Bahía Portete (Guajira) was a targeted attack<br>on women with profound implications on a relatively populous, but historically<br>threatened, indigenous minority. It simultaneously exemplifies the highly functional<br>use of violence against women, and the role of deep-seated institutional and societal<br>discrimination against marginalized communities. The massacre not only threatened<br>the historical, cultural and mythical patrimony of the community, but also its ethnic<br>survival. “La Masacre de Bahía Portete: Mujeres Wayuu en la mira”, CNRR, Bogotá,<br>2010.''		''1. While the regional statistics and map refer to the departments of Guajira and Cesar<br>as a whole, the information below focuses on conflict and humanitarian dynamics in<br>Guajira and the northern region of Cesar.<br>2. Arias, Gerson, “Pasado y Presente del entorno de seguridad en La Guajira”,<br>Fundación Ideas para la Paz and VerdadAbierta.com, Bogotá, 27 October 2010,<br>Presentation at Event.<br>3. Reyes Posada, Alejandro. 2008. Guerreros y Campesinos: El despojo de la tierra en<br>Colombia. Bogotá: Fescol, Grupo Editorial Norma, p. 208.<br>4. As asserted by UNHCHR, impunity is a “structural problem affecting the full<br>enjoyment of rights.” “Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human<br>Rights on the situation of human rights in Colombia”, UNHCHR, 31 January 2012.<br>5. Some Army officers continue to deny extrajudicial executions, including “false<br>positives”, instead discrediting the justice system and victims. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 8.<br>6. “Minería en Colombia: ¿a qué precio?, Boletín informativo no. 18 PBI Colombia”,<br>Peace Brigades International, Bogotá, November 2011, p. 32<br>7. Ibid.<br>8. UNHCHR, 2012, p. 5.<br>9. Notorious paramilitary Jorge 40 allied with José María Barros Ipuana and José María<br>Gómez to establish this front, but resistance by traditional indigenous structures has<br>been fierce and sometimes violent. “Dinámica Reciente de la Confrontación Armada<br>en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta”, Observatorio de Derechos Humanos de la<br>Vicepresidencia, February 2006.<br>10. The massacre on April 18, 2004 in Bahía Portete (Guajira) was a targeted attack<br>on women with profound implications on a relatively populous, but historically<br>threatened, indigenous minority. It simultaneously exemplifies the highly functional<br>use of violence against women, and the role of deep-seated institutional and societal<br>discrimination against marginalized communities. The massacre not only threatened<br>the historical, cultural and mythical patrimony of the community, but also its ethnic<br>survival. “La Masacre de Bahía Portete: Mujeres Wayuu en la mira”, CNRR, Bogotá,<br>2010.''<br>

			II. NORTE DE SANTANDER ==

			[[Image:Norte_de_Santander.jpg\|420x570px]]

			<br>The Department has a geostrategic location, which has made it a key corridor for drug and human trafficking, as well as arms and fuel smuggling. The high presence of non-state armed groups and criminal organizations in the border areas create security risks that impact the civilian population and exacerbate humanitarian needs. Over the past two years there have been massacres, homicides, kidnappings and human trafficking throughout the zone.1<br>The end of the armed conflict in the region remains elusive, particularly taking into account the intensity of the armed conflict along the border with Venezuela. Non-state armed groups and criminal organizations have reportedly formed alliances to exploit drug trafficking. Manual drug crop eradication processes take place throughout the Catatumbo area of Norte de Santander, leading to constant protests, armed confrontations and an increase in the use of landmines. These events lead to displacement risk and affect local food security.2<br>Children and teens are vulnerable to recruitment by illegal armed groups, particularly in Catatumbo and the Cúcuta Metropolitan area, and prevention policies need to be further developed and implemented. There are two reports of threats by the FARC to recruit 7-year-old boys.3 There are periodic trainings and minors reportedly participate in isolated operations. The Motilón-Barí community is considered to be an indigenous community at high- risk due to the conflict.4 Another concern is human trafficking, as well as high SGBV and HIV/AIDS rates among IDPs.<br>In 2010, armed actions increased to 62 reported events related to the armed conflict, compared to 47 in 2009. During 2010, 27 out of the 40 municipalities, representing 67.5 per cent of the Department, were affected by armed or violent actions related to conflict.5 According to the local NGO Progresar, there were 60 reported cases of forced disappearance in 2010, 90 per cent of which were concentrated in the municipalities of Cúcuta and Villa del Rosario.6 Since 2008, Human Rights and IDP organization leaders have reported numerous threats.7 Non-state armed groups have threatened former government employees and candidates to public office.<br>The threat of displacement is mostly individual, though there are risks of mass displacement in areas such as Catatumbo. In 2010, the accumulated number of IDPs reached 79,851 expelled and 101,654 received. There is an under-registry, with a high percentage of ‘non-inclusion’ of IDP declarations on the part of former Acción Social, including non-registry of “inter-vereda”<br>28 (rural displacement within a municipality) or inter-urban displacement, which cannot be declared according to Law 387 or are invisible; flight to other regions or across the Venezuelan border.<br>The 2010-2011 rainy season left a total of 61,746 persons affected in Norte de Santander, and caused flooding and landslides in 80 per cent of Department. The Gramalote municipality was entirely destroyed and must be re-located due to geological fissures. During 2011, the local authorities reported 3,321 new families affected by the rainy season. While adults consumed three daily food rations, children consumed just two.8 The WFP delivered 8,249 food rations to 2,749 families, 13,745 people. The National Response Organization Colombia Humanitaria has given monetary resources to respond to the needs identified on food, shelter and sanitation.<br>The rainy season also led to the collapse of 71 per cent (1,017 of 1,436km of roads) of the secondary road system, including the road infrastructure connecting the capital, Cúcuta. This resulted not only in the isolation of the capital, but also in constraints for humanitarian access.<br>APM/UXO presence also hinders access and mobility, not only for the local population, but also for humanitarian organizations. In 2010 there were 43 APM/UXO events, killing one civilian and 31 military personnel. The Department has among the top five numbers of victims of these devices in Colombia. The risk is exacerbated as guerrillas use these devices in their attempt to block the entrance of manual eradicators of coca crops in their zones of influence.



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MemoriasIEH en 16:44 11 jul 2012

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MemoriasIEH en 16:44 11 jul 2012

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	== I. LA GUAJIRA/NORTH CESAR1 ==		== I. LA GUAJIRA/NORTH CESAR1 ==

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MemoriasIEH en 16:43 11 jul 2012

2012-07-11T16:43:37Z

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	== I. LA GUAJIRA/NORTH CESAR1 ==		== I. LA GUAJIRA/NORTH CESAR1 ==

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